DIT scores and political ideology: evidence of a non-significant relationship by Bean, David F. et al.
Fairfield University 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield 
Business Faculty Publications Charles F. Dolan School of Business 
9-2001 
DIT scores and political ideology: evidence of a non-significant 
relationship 
David F. Bean 
Richard Bernardi 
Dawn W. Massey 
Fairfield University, dmassey@fairfield.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/business-facultypubs 
Copyright 2001 Dawn Massey, David F. Bean, Richard Bernardi 
Repository Citation 
Bean, David F.; Bernardi, Richard; and Massey, Dawn W., "DIT scores and political ideology: evidence of a 
non-significant relationship" (2001). Business Faculty Publications. 94. 
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/business-facultypubs/94 
Published Citation 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATION: David F. Bean, Richard Bernardi, Dawn Massey. (2001). “DIT scores and political 
ideology: evidence of a non-significant relationship,”, Presented by David Bean at 8th Annual International 
Conference Promoting Business Ethics, Chicago, September 2001 . 
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-
holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu. 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIT SCORES AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: 
 
EVIDENCE OF A NON-SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
 
 
 
David F. Bean 
Assistant Professor 
Hagan School of Business 
Iona College 
New Rochelle, NY 10801 
 
Richard A. Bernardi* 
Professor 
Gabelli School of Business 
Roger Williams University 
 
and 
 
Dawn W. Massey 
Assistant Professor 
Charles F. Dolan School of Business 
Fairfield University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Contact the Corresponding Author at: 
Telephone: (401) 254-3672; FAX: (401) 254-3545; Email: rbernardi@rwu.edu 
 2
DIT SCORES AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: 
EVIDENCE OF A NON-SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The present study was motivated by concern about the validity of the DIT and 
methodological issues in Fisher and Sweeney (2001, 1998) studies.  Our study of 98 accounting 
students from three private institutions in the eastern U.S. generates results that directly 
contradict those of Fisher and Sweeney’s (1998).  Using the nine-point scale, we could reject our 
three hypotheses relating to DIT scores associating with political orientation.  First, we find that 
there was not a significant difference between the pre-test DIT scores of liberal and conservative 
politically orientated students. Second, the follow on DIT test scores for those students who were 
not politically conservative did not decrease when responding from a conservative perspective.  
Third, the follow on DIT test scores for those students who were not politically liberal did not 
increase when responding from a liberal perspective.   
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INTRODUCTION 
During the past 10 years, ethics research in accounting using the DIT has dramatically 
increased.  This increase is not only due to an increased emphasis on ethics as an important 
consideration in accounting research, but it is also due to an increase in the new graduates of 
doctoral programs (Ponemon, 1988; Bernardi, 1991; Massey, 1997; Thorne, 1997) who felt the 
need to challenge the existing ethical beliefs of accounting.  A common thread in their research 
interests is the use of Rest’s Defining Issues Test (1979).  Ponemon examined the average level 
of moral development by staff level in public accounting.  Bernardi found that high-moral 
development managers detected fraud at a significantly higher rate when they were provided 
with information concerning client integrity ratings.  Massey and Thorne developed tests of 
moral reasoning based on the Defining Issues Tests that used auditing based dilemmas. 
Fisher and Sweeney (2001, p. 3) question the continued use of the Defining Issues Test 
DIT because research to date provides only “relatively modest relationships found between 
moral reasoning of accountants . . . and professional judgments and behavior”.  Perhaps a more 
cogent argument would be that the DIT uses generic dilemmas and that the use of auditing-
based-dilemmas (Massey, 1997; Thorne, 1997) might provide clearer results.  Fisher and 
Sweeney’s argument continues that scores on the DIT “favor those with political liberalism to 
political Conservatism” (p. 3).  Similar arguments were voiced by Gilligan (1988) who 
maintained that the DIT was favored (opposed) the male (female) justice (care) oriented 
reasoning.  Bernardi and Arnold (1997) found that, rather than scoring lower than men, women 
actually scored significantly higher than men on the DIT.  Bernardi and Arnold note that 
Gilligan’s results may have resulted from sampling bias since her sample only consisted of 32 
subjects divided into eight groups of four (two men and two women).  Our research examines the 
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same hypotheses as Fisher and Sweeney (1998) to determine whether their findings might be the 
result of faulty assumptions about sample distribution. 
 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Moral Development 
 We can partially describe the theory of moral development through its four 
characteristics: cognitive, structural, developmental and sequential.  First, moral development 
theory maintains that cognition is an integral part of the ethical decision process.  Second, 
cognitive structures frame the six levels of moral reasoning.  Third, moral development is a 
cognitive process that develops over time.  Fourth, the developmental process is sequential 
because moral reasoning progresses in one direction only (Ponemon & Gabhart, 1993).  
While an individual may progress to higher levels of moral reasoning structures over 
time, they cannot regress. Rest and Narváez (1994) describe this developmental process using a 
staircase as an example.  Increases in moral reasoning are likened to an individual climbing a 
staircase; development (climbing the staircase) occurs in discrete steps. According to this 
developmental perspective, how morality is perceived is a function of an individual’s level of 
moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1958, 1979).  The three levels of Kohlberg’s moral reasoning are: 
pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional or principled (Table 1).   
Insert Table 1 about here 
Although in the early course of his research, Kohlberg (1958, 1969) noted an apparent 
retrogression in some subjects’ moral development, upon closer examination, Kohlberg (1973, 
1976) later realized that these seemingly retrogressive responses were the result of subjects’ 
“transitioning” from lower to higher levels of moral reasoning. That is, transitioning from lower 
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to higher levels of moral reasoning can be likened to a child’s transitioning from crawling to 
walking. During a child’s transitioning, s/he might at one time walk to a desired destination but 
later, because it is a more effortless method of self-propulsion, get to that same destination by 
crawling. Similarly, during the moral reasoning transitioning process, although people may focus 
on higher-stage moral considerations, for ease of consideration, they may later focus on moral 
considerations from the previous stage in Kohlberg’s model. Thus, the levels in Kohlberg’s 
model are sequential; people move from one to the next and do not revert to previous levels once 
they have mastered the next level.  
 
Stability of DIT Scores 
McGeorge (1975) finds that the DIT is immune to artificial score inflation. In an 
experiment, he had three groups of subjects complete the DIT twice. In a fully randomized 
design, each of the groups completed the DIT once with ordinary instructions. In one group 
(Control Group), the other completion of the DIT was also according to the original instructions. 
In the second group (Experimental Group), McGeorge asked subjects to “fake good” on their 
other completion of the DIT. In the third group (Experimental group), McGeorge asked subjects 
to “fake bad” on their other completion of the DIT. Importantly, although McGeorge found no 
significant differences in DIT scores for any other condition, he found subjects’ DIT scores were 
significantly different in the “fake bad” conditions (whether they were in the ordinary-bad or 
bad-ordinary group).  
Thus, while subjects could lower their scores on the DIT in response to instructions to 
“fake bad,” they could not artificially inflate them. These results reinforce the notion that moral 
reasoning is a cognitive skill. That is, while subjects can understand and therefore utilize moral 
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reasoning below their level of moral development, because they do not comprehend moral 
reasoning considerations above their level of moral development, they cannot utilize moral 
reasoning above their level of moral development. 
 
Political Ideology and the DIT – Current Debate 
The DIT is grounded in Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive theory of moral development.  It 
appears often in psychology and social science studies (Rest, 1986; 1999).  It is very popular 
with accounting researchers as a measure of moral judgment in ethics based research.  In general 
ethics researchers find that the moral judgment of accounting students and public accountants is 
less advanced than that of individuals at similar educational levels. 
Some researchers question the validity the DIT and believe that the DIT produces a 
biased measure of moral reasoning ability.  Emler et al. (1983) assert that the DIT score is a 
measure of political attitude.  Fisher and Sweeney (1998, 2001) argue and present evidence that 
the DIT confounds political ideology with moral reasoning development.  If this is so, the results 
for much of the ethics based research in accounting are questionable and this body of research 
becomes extremely difficult to assess and interpret. 
A primary assumption of moral development theory is that an individual at a given stage 
of moral development is incapable of understanding higher order moral arguments.  This gives 
rise to the basic tenet that DIT scores can be “faked downward” but not “faked upward”.  In 
essence an individual can lower his/her score on the DIT by identifying lower order responses 
but should not be able to identify higher order responses as they are beyond the cognitive 
capacity of the individual.   
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Fisher and Sweeney (1998, 2001) argue that the DIT has an underlying political content 
that over (under) states an individual’s true capacity for moral reasoning.  This may cause an 
individual to consciously or unconsciously reject more advanced responses even though the 
individual understands the underlying moral reasoning.  Their basic arguments are as follows: 
 
“But if a politically conservative person comprehends the cognitive complexity of 
principled DIT responses and chooses to avoid ranking those responses as 
important because he or she associates this viewpoint with liberalism, then the P 
score would not be measuring this person’s most advanced moral thinking.  .  
.Similarly, a politically liberal test-taker may overstate his or her DIT P score by 
ranking higher-order response items as important because of their association 
with liberal ideology, without comprehending the underlying moral content 
(Fisher and Sweeney, 2001, p. 7).” 
 
 
Fisher and Sweeney Studies 
In their 1998 study, Fisher and Sweeney had 112 undergraduate student accounting 
majors as experimental subjects.  Subjects first responded to the three-story version of the DIT, a 
National Election Survey, and also indicated on a seven-point scale how liberal or conservative 
they were concerning important political and social issues.  After a two-week period the subjects 
were instructed to complete the DIT from either the perspective of an “extremely conservative” 
or “extremely liberal” person, which was done on a random basis.  As discussed in the 
introduction of this paper, we question the methodology of Fisher and Sweeney for this 
experiment.  In that study subjects decreased their P scores by responding to the DIT from an 
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“extremely conservative” perspective and increased their P scores by responding to the DIT from 
and “extremely liberal’ perspective.  As a result, they suggest that some items in the DIT may 
have a political content separate from their contribution to the assessment of moral judgment. 
In their 2001 study, Fisher and Sweeney had 221 undergraduate student accounting 
majors from two Midwestern universities as experimental subjects.  A between-subject-design 
was utilized and subjects were randomly assigned to either the control or experimental condition.  
Both groups completed the six-dilemma DIT.  The control group completed the DIT under 
standard test instructions.  In the experimental group, subjects received modified instructions 
informing them that: 
 
The Defining issues Test is a standardized measure of moral judgment.  We are 
interested in whether you can identify the statements designed to represent the  
highest level of moral judgment. 
 
Subjects indicated on a seven-point scale how liberal or conservative they were concerning 
important political and social issues and this served as the basis for classifying subjects as liberal, 
moderate or conservative. Again, as indicated in the introduction, we question this methodology.  
The experimental results show that, for conservatives, the mean DIT P score was 
significantly higher (p < .05) under the modified instructions than under the standard 
instructions.  As a result, they suggest that the DIT systematically understates the moral 
reasoning abilities of political conservatives.  There were no significant differences for 
moderates.  The mean DIT P score for liberals was significantly lower (p < .10) under the 
modified instructions than under the standard test instructions. As a result, they suggest that the 
DIT systematically overstates the moral reasoning abilities of political conservatives.  When the 
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standard instructions were used, the mean P score for liberals is significantly higher (p<.001) 
than the mean P scores for moderates and conservatives.  When the modified instructions were 
used, the mean P scores did not differ by political ideology (p = .920).  As a result, they suggest 
that instructions may be causing subjects to pursue DIT statements consistent with their preferred 
political ideology, preventing the instrument from presenting a true measure of the person’s 
moral competence.  Given Fisher and Sweeney’s research and our concern about their basic 
methodology for determining political orientation, we propose to test the same three hypotheses 
that they used in their research: 
 
H1: Accounting students with a liberal political identification will, on average, 
attain higher DIT P scores than accounting students who are not liberal. 
 
H2: Accounting students who are not politically conservative will decrease their 
DIT P scores when responding from a conservative perspective. 
 
H3: Accounting students who are not politically liberal will increase their DIT P 
scores when responding from a liberal perspective.  
 
 
 
SUBJECTS AND MEASURES 
Sample 
One hundred and twenty-six students enrolled in accounting classes at three schools were 
initially sampled as part of this research. Of these, 28 were eliminated because they failed the 
meaningless or consistency tests on the Defining Issues Test.  This left a final sample of 98 
students in the sample.  These students took the DIT twice during a three-week period.  The 
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present study was motivated by concern about the validity of the DIT and methodological issues 
in Fisher and Sweeney (2001, 1998) studies.  They assigned subjects to the experimental groups: 
“extremely conservative”, “moderate”, and “extremely liberal” on a random basis.  Our research 
methodology controls for political orientation by assigning students to the three treatment groups 
based on their actual political orientation and P score.  Furthermore, Fisher and Sweeney use a 7-
point Likert scale to classify political ideology (conservative, moderate, liberal) while the current 
study uses a 9-point Likert scale.    
 
Defining Issues Test 
We used the shortened version (i.e., three dilemmas) of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) to 
measure the subjects' moral development (Rest, 1979b).  Twelve considerations that reflect 
reasoning at the upper five stage levels of moral development follow each dilemma  
(e.g., Stage One considerations are not used in the DIT).  The test directs individuals to rank the 
four most important considerations for each of the three dilemmas.  These four considerations 
are used to measure the percent of Stage Five and Six considerations in a subject's decision 
process.  Test scores range from zero to 90; a score of zero (90) indicates that all ranked 
considerations were in the lower four (upper two) stage levels.   
 
Political Attitudes Survey 
We also use the National Election Survey (NES, Appendix A, items a to e, Miller, 1992) 
that asks subjects to indicate their opinions about social and economic issues on a seven point 
Likert scale.  We asked our subjects to indicate their political orientation on a modified version 
of the scale used by Fisher and Sweeney (2000, 1998).  Fisher and Sweeney use a seven-point 
Likert scale that is unevenly apportioned to classify subjects as liberal, moderate, or conservative 
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(i.e., 1-to-3 are for conservative, 4 is moderate, and 5-to-7 are for liberal).  While this is 
convenient and provides an approximately equal distribution between liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives, we believe it is inappropriate to assign only one data point to the moderate 
classification and three each to the liberal and conservative classifications.  Our study utilizes a 
nine point Likert scale that is evenly apportioned when assigning subjects to categories (See 
Appendix).  This expanded scale provides an equal number of data points for each of the three 
classifications. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Political Identifications and DIT P Scores (H1) 
 Table 2 presents the DIT scores by political orientation for the sample of 98 students.  
In addition to providing the P scores, we also provide scores for stages three, four, five and six.  
For comparison, we also provide the average scores for Fisher and Sweeney’s sample (1998) and 
the data from Rest’s (1987) standardization sample.  Hypothesis One tests whether accounting 
students with a liberal political identification will, on average, have a higher average DIT P score 
than accounting students who are not liberal in their political identification.  It is evident that 
Hypothesis One is not supported by the data in Table 2.  While those students having both 
moderate and conservative political identifications scored higher on the DIT, the differences 
were not significant. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Political Perspectives and Changes in DIT P Scores (H2 & H3) 
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 The data in Table 3 provide the two sets of average scores for each manipulation of 
political perspectives.  Hypothesis Two examines whether accounting students who are not 
politically conservative will decrease their DIT P scores when responding from a conservative 
perspective. The data in Table 3 indicate that, rather than decreasing, there was a slight increase 
in P scores for both of the group who were not conservative and who were told to respond from a 
conservative perspective.  However these increases in the DIT p scores were not significant.1   
Insert Table 2 about here 
 Hypothesis Three examines whether accounting students who are not politically liberal 
will increase their DIT P scores when responding from a liberal perspective. The data in Table 3 
indicate that there was a slight increase in P scores for both of the group who were not liberal 
and who were told to respond from a liberal perspective. While this follows the anticipated 
direction for Hypothesis Three, these increases were not significant.   
 
Inconsistencies between Fisher and Sweeney’s and Rest’s Data 
 There is an interesting contrast in Table 2.  Fisher and Sweeney (1998) report an 
average stage five score of 20.49 with an average P score of 38.16.  This means that the average 
stage six score for Fisher and Sweeney’s sample was 17.67 or about 46 percent (17.67/38.16) of 
their average P score.  This is approximately twice as high as the average stage six score reported 
by Rest for his standardization sample of 270 college graduates.  Rest’s average stage six score is 
only 8.16 or about 19 percent (8.16/43.19) of the average P score for his sample of college 
students.  Yet Rest’s average P score (43.19) is 46 percent higher than Fisher and Sweeney’s 
average P score (38.16).  Further, the highest stage six score is 26.7; consequently, Fisher and 
Sweeney’s sample was attaining an average stage six score that was 66 percent of the maximum 
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attainable.  If this were true, then their sample should also have a stage five score close to the 
maximum of 63.3 (90 – 26.7).  However, this is not the case. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Our results put into question the findings of Fisher and Sweeney (1998).  The data 
indicate that rather than following a predictable pattern, the changes in P scores appear to be 
random.  While we waited three weeks prior to the second testing, it appears that the changes in 
P scores may be attributable to a learning-curve effect in the sample results.  Additionally, the 
inconsistencies in the Fisher and Sweeney data are cause for concern.  We are unable to provide 
an explanation for their sample’s extremely high stage six scores (17.67 versus 8.16) compared 
to their below average stage five scores (20.49 versus 35.03) when compared to Rest’s 
standardization sample of college students. 
 Rather than affirming the validity of the DIT, our research questions the methodology 
used by Fisher and Sweeney.  While our results do not indicate that political orientation can 
affect DIT P scores, we also believe that a single study cannot stand alone.  We do not believe 
that their method of dividing the sample is a valid procedure.  Consequently, our study suggests 
that further empirical research is necessary. 
 Two limitations can be identified.  First, the research sample includes students from three 
schools.  While this sample includes one more school than Fisher and Sweeney’s sample, the 
generalizeability of our findings may be restricted and may not be applicable to the entire 
population of accounting students.  Second, the research assumes that Rest’s Defining Issues 
Test is capable of measuring moral development.   
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ENDNOTE 
1.  We also tested to determine whether politically liberal individuals who receive instructions to 
answer from an extremely liberal perspective were affected by the manipulation.  While there 
was a five-point difference in scores (30.43-25.43), the difference was not significant.  Had 
the sample size been at least 40, the five-point difference would have been significant at the 
.05 level. 
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TABLE 1 
        
SIX STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
        
Levels/Stages Description of Primary Reasoning at Specific Stage Level 
        
PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL -- Focus on Self 
        
Stage 1 Obedience: You do what you are told primarily to avoid punishment. 
        
Stage 2 Instrumental egoism and simple exchange: Let’s make a deal or only 
consider the cost and/or benefits to oneself. 
        
        
CONVENTIONAL LEVEL -- Focus on Relationships   
        
Stage 3 Interpersonal concordance: Be considerate, nice, and kind, and you’ll get 
along with people. The focus is on cooperation with those in your 
environment. 
        
Stage 4 Law and duty to social order: Everyone in society is obligated and 
protected by the law.  Focus is on cooperation with society in general. 
        
        
POST CONVENTIONAL LEVELS -- Focus on Personally Held Principles 
        
Stage 5 Societal consensus: You are obligated by whatever arrangements are 
agreed to by due process procedure.  Focus in on fairness of the law or 
rule as determined by equity and equality in the process of developing the 
rule. 
        
Stage 6 Non-arbitrary social cooperation: How rational and impartial people 
would organize cooperation is moral.  Focus is on fairness of the law or 
rules derived from general principles of just and right as determined by 
rational people. 
        
     Adapted from Rest (1979b) 
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TABLE 2 
 
Comparison of DIT scores by self-defined political orientations 
 
 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 P Score 
      
Liberals (n = 16)      
  Mean 22.71 35.82 18.59 5.99 24.58 
  Std Dev 14.71 13.57 14.81 6.76 13.94 
      
Moderates (n = 48)      
  Mean 21.81 32.03 25.10 3.13 28.23 
  Std Dev 12.05 13.18 13.89 5.24 14.38 
      
Conservatives (n = 34)      
  Mean 19.73 33.85 23.67 3.06 26.73 
  Std Dev 11.68 15.10 13.01 5.33 12.30 
      
Overall (n = 98) 
     
  Mean 21.45 32.76 23.73 3.64 27.37 
  Std Dev 12.24 13.53 13.82 5.61 13.52 
      
Rest's College (n = 270)      
  Mean 14.33 28.35 35.03 8.16 43.19 
      
Fisher & Sweeney (1998)      
  Mean 7.82 21.98 20.49 17.67 38.16 
      
 
Rest’s data from Guide for the Defining Issues Test (1987, 3-13) 
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TABLE 3 
 
Effects of political perspective on DIT scores 
 
 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 P Score   Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 P Score 
             
     LIBERALS      
             
Self-Presentation (n = 8)     Self-Presentation (n = 8)    
Mean 25.80 33.30 19.96 3.79 23.75  Mean 19.63 38.34 17.23 8.20 25.43 
Std Dev 15.57 17.30 18.00 4.55 17.14  Std Dev 14.13 9.00 11.91 8.13 10.99 
             
Extremely Conservative Perspective    Extremely Liberal Perspective   
Mean 25.04 34.89 19.95 4.21 24.18  Mean 22.10 32.14 20.85 9.58 30.43 
Std Dev 11.82 16.09 17.47 6.46 20.69  Std Dev 12.45 10.76 8.81 5.43 10.90 
             
             
     MODERATES      
             
Self-Presentation (n = 20)     Self-Presentation (n = 28)    
Mean 22.02 37.30 20.99 4.52 25.50  Mean 21.73 27.28 28.70 2.26 30.96 
Std Dev 12.19 12.66 13.19 5.20 12.86  Std Dev 12.39 11.10 13.49 5.21 14.87 
             
Extremely Conservative Perspective    Extremely Liberal Perspective   
Mean 20.48 33.67 22.90 4.02 26.92  Mean 15.20 38.12 23.68 5.01 28.69 
Std Dev 15.12 13.47 14.78 5.14 17.63  Std Dev 15.09 16.49 14.57 6.14 16.76 
             
             
     CONSERVATIVES      
             
Self-Presentation (n = 18)     Self-Presentation (n = 16)    
Mean 18.72 33.30 24.43 3.15 27.58  Mean 22.10 33.01 22.83 3.14 25.97 
Std Dev 10.57 13.35 14.28 5.78 13.37  Std Dev 12.23 16.67 12.30 5.10 11.76 
             
Extremely Conservative Perspective    Extremely Liberal Perspective   
Mean 16.54 36.20 22.98 3.50 26.48  Mean 17.81 34.98 20.72 6.04 26.76 
Std Dev 9.60 21.90 16.85 4.80 15.73  Std Dev 17.82 19.19 14.01 4.76 16.54 
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APPENDIX 
 
Political Attitudes Survey 
 
 
a. Some people feel that the federal government in Washington should see to it that every 
person has a job and good standard of living.  Others think that the government should 
just let each person get ahead on his/her own.  And of course, other people have opinions 
somewhere in between.  Where would you place yourself on this scale?  
 
Government sees to job 
and good standard of 
living. 
      Government lets each 
person get ahead on 
his/her own. 
          
          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
 
 
b. There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs.  Some feel that 
there should be a government insurance plan that would cover all medical and hospital 
expenses.  Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by individuals and through 
private insurance like Blue Cross.  Where would you place yourself?  
 
Government 
insurance plan. 
       Private insurance 
plan. 
          
          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
 
 
c. Some feel that the federal government in Washington should make every effort to 
improve the social and economic position of African-Americans and other minority 
groups.  Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help 
minorities because they should help themselves.  Where would you place yourself on this 
scale?  
 
Government should 
help minority groups 
        Minority groups 
should help 
themselves 
          
          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
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d. There has been much discussion concerning abortion during recent years.  Which of the 
following opinions best agrees with your view?   
 
1. Abortion should never be permitted. 
2. Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is in 
danger. 
3. Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have 
difficulty in caring for the child. 
4. Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should not require a woman to 
have a child she doesn’t want. 
 
 
 
e. There has been a lot of talk about women’s rights.  Some people feel that women should 
have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government.  Others feel 
that the women’s place is in the home.  Where would you place yourself on this scale. 
 
Women and men 
should have an equal 
role 
        Women’s place is in  
the home 
          
          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
 
 
f. Concerning important political and social issues, where would you place yourself on this 
scale? 
 
 
Extremely liberal 
      Extremely 
conservative  
          
          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
